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ABSTRACT
The issuance of Brazilian Law 11.638/2007 is a critical step in the convergence of the Brazilian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAPs) towards International Financial Reporting Standards. After the law was implemented and later modified by Provisional Executive 
Order 449/2008 (converted into Law 11.941/2009), certain accounting choices were allowed during the transition period. The Brazilian GAAPs 
allowed for restructuring costs and costs related to opening a new facility to be recognised as assets. As a transitional provision, companies 
were allowed to choose between maintaining or eliminating these values. In this paper, we attempted to identify which company characteristics 
were associated with this accounting choice. The final sample consisted of Brazilian companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA, and a logistic 
regression identified two characteristics. Participation in one of the three different corporate governance levels of the BM&FBOVESPA was 
associated with the choice to derecognise the deferred assets, while companies decided to maintain the deferred asset if it was relatively large. 
The empirical evidence reported here contributes to the literature by explaining the manner in which a set of firm characteristics is related to 
a firm’s accounting choices.
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1 Note that the Central Bank of Brazil only adopted some of the technical decrees from the CPC.
2 This measure is referred to as Law 11.941/2009 throughout the text instead of as Provisional Measure 449/2008.
 1  IntroductIon
The passage of Law 11.638/2007 marked the beginning 
of a transition process in Brazilian accounting procedures. 
The gradual change towards the international accounting 
model embodied by the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) was carried out by the Committee of Ac-
counting Standards (Comitê de Pronunciamentos Contá-
beis - CPC) and ratified by regulatory organisations, such 
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão 
de Valores Mobiliários - CVM), the Federal Accounting 
Council (Conselho Federal de Contabilidade - CFC), the 
Superintendent of Private Securities (Superintendência 
de Seguros Privados - SUSEP), and the Central Bank of 
Brazil1(Banco Central do Brasil - Bacen).
The transition can be divided into two phases: the first 
phase was during 2008, when the initial changes were im-
plemented with the introduction of Law 11.638/2007 and 
initial decrees from the CPC; the second phase refers to 
the adoption of the complete set of CPC decrees released 
through 2010.
This study focuses on the first phase, during which bu-
sinesses had to apply specific rules during the transition 
period. The Brazilian legislation permitted two corpora-
te accounting choices: maintaining or derecognising the 
balance of deferred assets and the balance of revaluation 
reserves. Thus, Brazil represents a natural experiment on 
these two choices. 
As will be discussed later, the majority of companies 
that had a balance in revaluation reserves opted to maintain 
that balance. Thus, we use information on these balances as 
a control variable and focus on the choice of maintaining or 
derecognising deferred assets. 
The original text of Law 11.638/2007 allowed pre-ope-
rational costs and expenses to be cast in deferred assets with 
restructuring in case the company thought that they would 
benefit in the future. However, CPC 04 – Intangible Assets 
established that such costs should be treated as expenses.
The potential conflict between the text of the Law 
and the technical announcements from the CPC was 
resolved through the revision of Provisional Measure 
449/2008 (MP 449/2008). This measure included Ar-
ticle 299-A in Law 6.404/1976, establishing that the 
existing balances on 31/12/2008 would be classified as 
deferred assets and could not be allocated to another 
group. These balances could remain assets under this 
classification until they were fully amortised. Later, 
Provisional Measure 449/2008 was converted into Law 
11.941/20092.
After the publication of Law 11.941/2009, the CPC 
emitted Technical Decree CPC 13 – Initial Adoption of 
Law 11.638/07 and Provisional Measure 449/08. The ap-
plication of this decree became obligatory for publicly tra-
ded companies after the publication of Deliberation CVM 
565/2008. This document established an option for costs 
recognised as deferred assets that could not be reclassified 
to other groups: these costs could be subtracted from the 
opening balance on the date of transition or maintained in 
this group until their complete amortisation.
Thus, the initial adoption of Law 11.941/2009 and the 
CPC’s Technical Decree 13 introduced new accounting 
choices for companies that were defined by Fields, Lys, and 
Vincent (2001) as decisions in which the principal objec-
tive is to influence the result of the accounting system. In 
this context, this study investigates the following problem: 
What are the characteristics differentiating companies that 
decided to maintain versus derecognise the balance of de-
ferred assets?
The literature on accounting choices was analysed, and 
the following potential explanatory variables were identi-
fied: the company’s level of corporate governance accor-
ding to BM&FBOVESPA, earnings-based rewards to admi-
nistrators; the issuance of American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs), audits performed by one of the four large auditing 
firms, revaluation reserves on the transition date, the level 
of indebtedness, and the relative size of the deferred assets.
The results obtained from the logistic regression model 
suggest that participating in different levels of corporate 
governance and the relative size of the balance of deferred 
assets are associated with the accounting choice regarding 
deferred assets. There is also evidence that auditing by the 
four large firms (“Big Four”) was associated with maintai-
ning the balance of deferred assests, in contrast with ex-
pectations. As will be discussed later, due to sample size, 
the BigFour variable potentially captures other firm cha-
racteristics, as demonstrated in recent studies (Lawrence, 
Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011). Thus, this finding should 
be interpreted with caution.
 2  theoretIcAl FrAmeworK
According to Paulo (2007), accounting information is 
influenced by alternative measurement and disclosure cri-
teria, so the administrator can choose between the standar-
ds and practices allowed by existing regulations. According 
to Fields et al. (2001), accounting choices made by mana-
gers are influenced by the existence of agency costs, infor-
mation asymmetry, and externalities. 
Agency costs and information asymmetry: Jensen and Me-
ckling (1976) showed that parts of a contract act to maximise 
personal utility. An “agent” will not always prioritise the interest 
of the “principal” in his decision. Thus, costs aimed at aligning 
these interests within an organisation are called agency costs. 
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Fields et al. (2001) presented two contractual issues 
that may lead to agency conflict: executive compen-
sation and bond covenants. The tie between execu-
tive compensation and earnings and the existence of 
contractual clauses in debt collection processes create 
incentives for certain accounting choices to be made 
to meet a specific set of goals (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986). Such factors can be exacerbated by the fact that 
managers and suppliers of capital (shareholders and 
creditors) hold different sets of information, negatively 
impacting the return required to justify an investment 
in the firm (Bartov & Bodnar, 1996).
Externalities: The management of accounting in-
formation can be defined as the use of discretionary 
actions by administrators to change the interpretation 
of the company’s economic and financial reality. Ac-
cording to Stolowy and Breton (2004), this practice is 
motivated by the possibilities of transferring wealth be-
tween the company and society (political costs), using 
wealth to acquire resources (capital costs), or transfer-
ring wealth to the administrators themselves (compen-
sation plans). 
Each accounting choice is expected to be directed 
by a set of economic incentives (Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 
2001). In Brazil, many studies were developed to focus on 
earnings management and its relationship with different 
levels of corporate governance, bonus programs for admi-
nistrators, and taxes (see, for example, Paulo, 2007, and 
Perlingeiro, 2009). Compensation plans and tax levels are 
commonly cited incentives in the literature and are rela-
ted to certain choices (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). 
In the next section, we describe the variables that were 
used in this article based on the literature on accounting 
choices.
 2.1  different levels of corporate governance
Various corporate governance mechanisms are esta-
blished in a firm to minimise agency conflict by alig-
ning interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Andrade and 
Rossetti (2007, p.138) argued that the processes esta-
blished by a corporation’s senior management to meet 
their goals can be divided into four groups: processes 
that protect the rights of the parties, systems that di-
rect and monitor the company’s activities, the power 
structure within the corporation, and the regulatory 
system governing the company’s internal and external 
relations.
The New Market, which was created in 2000, is an 
example of a voluntary mechanism of signalling an 
enhanced corporate governance structure. Santana 
(2008, p.11) stated that the goal of membership in the 
New Market is to meet the demands of investors. Fur-
thermore, Corporate Governance levels 1 and 2 serve 
as thresholds allowing for the gradual adaptation of 
already listed companies (for cases in which direct 
migration to the maximum level is not considered fe-
asible).
In an empirical study of publicly traded Brazilian 
companies in the period between 2003 and 2004, Ra-
mos and Martinez (2006) investigated whether “good” 
corporate governance practices minimise earnings 
management and found that firms in New Market le-
vels 1 and 2 showed less variability in discretionary 
accruals compared to those that did not adhere to the 
programs. 
In contrast, Silveira (2006) found no statistical 
evidence that companies listed at levels 1 and 2 of 
Bovespa’s corporate governance and that pay their ma-
nagers through stock options have higher levels of ear-
nings management than unlisted companies.
Thus, this article used different levels of corporate 
governance as variables that could explain the accoun-
ting choice analysed here. The expectation is that this 
group of companies has a greater incentive to ensure that 
their financial statements are comparable with those of 
international companies and thus that these companies 
would opt to derecognise their deferred assets to reduce 
accounting differences. 
 2.2  Administrative participation in profits
As discussed previously, authors such as Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) claim that administrators compen-
sated based on earnings have a greater incentive to in-
crease earnings by, for example, manipulating the rules 
used to calculate earnings or choosing rules that favour 
increased earnings reports. This assertion is supported 
by evidence from Healy (1985) and DeGeorge, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser (1999).
The choice of whether to maintain or derecognise 
the balance could alter the compensation of adminis-
trators. Derecognising the balance of deferred assets 
against accumulated profits would reduce expenses by 
amortisation in subsequent periods, giving adminis-
trators an incentive to choose this option. Thus, it is 
expected that administrators will have an incentive to 
derecognise the balance of deferred charges to avoid 
the recognition of these expenses.
 2.3  Issuance of Adrs
Lopes and Tukamoto (2007) studied earnings ma-
nagement by comparing publicly traded Brazilian com-
panies that issued ADRs with those that did not. Their 
results did not show statistically significant differences 
in the level of “management” of financial results ba-
sed on the issuance of ADRs. The degree of conditional 
conservatism was also not affected by the issuance of 
ADRs (Santos & Costa, 2008). 
Silveira, Barros, and Famá (2004) claim that the sub-
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3 Assuming that the ADR issuers are in levels II and III.
mission to the regulatory structures demanded by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required to 
issue ADRs can increase the company’s visibility. Con-
sidering that these companies follow both the Brazilian 
and the North American accounting models3, re is an 
incentive to make these results highly comparable. Be-
cause the United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (US-GAAPs) do not allow for the recognition 
of deferred assets, companies issuing ADRs would have 
an incentive to lower the balance of this group of assets.
 2.4  Auditing
Almeida and Almeida (2007) presented evidence of a 
difference in the level of discretionary accruals between 
publicly traded companies audited by the Big Four (De-
loitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pri-
cewaterhouseCoopers) and other auditing firms. The re-
sults suggest that the Big Four are associated with a lower 
degree of earnings management.
Azevedo and Costa (2008) observed the effect of 
changing the auditing firm on earnings management in 
publicly traded Brazilian companies and found that a 
change in auditing firm does not necessarily reduce the 
level of earnings management in Brazilian companies. 
As accounting scandals that occurred in the internatio-
nal market led to a growing appreciation of corporate 
governance practices, Martinez (2010) investigated the 
correlations between the characteristics of a firm’s exe-
cutive board and auditing firm and the propensity to 
manage earnings in Brazil. These results showed that 
national auditing firms were more permissive regarding 
management practices compared to international firms.
Recently, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011) 
studied whether the auditing firm influences accounting 
choices and the quality of disclosed information or whe-
ther the effect of the auditing firm arises from other fac-
tors. Using a matching procedure, the authors presented 
evidence that the firm’s characteristics are more relevant 
than those of the auditing firm. Higher quality could 
result from a better governance structure. Beasley and 
Petroni (2001) pointed to the relationship between the 
characteristics of corporate governance, especially the 
Board of Directors, and the contracting of auditing firms 
and found that companies with more independent Boar-
ds tend to employ higher quality firms (Lin & Liu, 2009). 
As a result, firms with stronger governance structures 
present more accurate information (Lopes & Walker, 
2012). The current study also uses corporate governan-
ce structure as a variable with the expectation that this 
effect is minimal. 
Auditors have an incentive to behave conservatively 
(Watts, 2003; Feldman & Read, 2010), and derecognising 
the balance would make the values similar to those of the 
international model. Thus, it is expected that companies 
audited by the Big Four will opt to derecognise the balance 
of the deferred assets. 
 2.5  relative size of the deferred balance
Companies with significant balances of deferred 
assets could have different economic incentives than 
those with smaller (or insignificant) balances. The me-
thodology for retroactive adjustment can lead the com-
pany to derecognise the amount directly into equity, 
depending on the magnitude of its impact (Cormier, 
Demaria, Lapointe-Antunes, & Teller, 2009). Compa-
nies with significant balances of deferred assets are ex-
pected to opt to maintain these balances. However, it 
is important to control for the size of the company in 
this analysis because the impact of reducing earnings 
or future amortisation should be evaluated in light of 
the company’s size.
 2.6  revaluation of fixed assets
Another relevant change introduced by Law 11.638/2007 
was the elimination of the spontaneous revaluation of goo-
ds. The accounting treatment given to the revaluation re-
serve balance according to Technical Decree CPC 13 is si-
milar to that given to the balance of deferred assets.
The study conducted by Schvirck and Giasson (2008) 
sought to distinguish between the economic profiles of 
companies that revaluate assets and those that do not. The 
authors concluded that companies that do not revaluate 
their fixed assets have better economic-financial indica-
tors than those that do revaluate their fixed assets. Lopes 
and Walker (2012) demonstrated that the option to reva-
luate assets in Brazil is linked to the economic incentives 
of management rather than the attempt to demonstrate 
the economic value of assets. 
Because the option to maintain or derecognise the re-
valuation reserve may be associated with similar incenti-
ves to the accounting choice for deferred assets, this choi-
ce was included as a control variable for companies that 
had revaluation reserves on 31/12/2007.
 2.7  Indebtedness
The ratio between the use of debt capital and the use 
of equity in the financial structure is determined by se-
veral internal and external factors. Silva (2008) analy-
sed the determinants and economic consequences of 
accounting choices from the perspective of contractual 
covenants. The results revealed no evidence of changes 
in opportunistic voluntary practices to avoid violating 
accounting covenants and showed that administrators 
take real actions to impact the company’s cash flow. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) hypothesised that com-
panies with more debt would have an incentive to make 
certain accounting choices. Beatty and Weber (2003) cor-
roborated this claim with empirical evidence of the rela-
tionship between established covenants and these choices. 
Thus, a negative association is expected between indebted-
ness and the choice to lower the balance of deferred assets. 
Fernando Drago Lorencini & Fábio Moraes da Costa
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 23, n. 58, p. 52-64, jan./fev./mar./abr.  201256
 Table 1   Identificacion of companies with balances of 






assets balanced to other groups
(55) (45)
(=) Companies with a deferred 
assets balance subject to choice 
96 144
 3  methodology
The variable studied in this paper is dichotomous 
because the companies could choose to maintain or de-
recognise the balance of deferred assets. In this case, it 
is considered appropriate to implement a logistic re-
gression. The sample used in this study, which is des-
cribed in Table 1, consists of 96 observations of parent 
company’s financial statements and 144 consolidated 
statements. Given the sample size, a stepwise procedu-
re was used to mitigate the potential spurious effects of 
variables unrelated to this choice. 
The independent variables used in this study were 
selected based on the literature and are as follows: the 
company’s level of corporate governance according to 
BM&FBOVESPA, whether the company’s administrators 
share in earnings, whether the company issues ADRs in the 
New York Stock Exchange, whether the company is audited 
by a Big Four auditing firm, the relative size of the deferred 
assets, the presence of a revaluation reserve of fixed assets, 
and the level of debt. 
This study seeks to determine the relationship betwe-
en a firm’s characteristics and its choice regarding de-
ferred assets. There may be endogeneity between some 
variables, such as the choice of an auditing firm and the 
probability of making a specific accounting choice. Thus, 
these results should be interpreted primarily based on 
the relationships between the variables rather than as in-
dicators of causality. 
 3.1  Instruments of data collection
Brazil is different from many countries in its re-
quirement of the publication of individual financial 
statements (parent company) and consolidated sta-
tements. The empirical evidence in the literature on 
accounting choices is generally based on consolida-
ted data (Fields et al., 2001; Beatty & Weber, 2003; 
Cormier et al., 2009), and the literature considers the 
subsidiary company’s choices to be defined by those 
of the parent company. 
To contribute to this debate, in this study, the parent 
company’s choice was taken into account based on indi-
vidual statements to enable the company’s decision to be 
identified without interference from other effects, such as 
the performance of controlling stockholders in subsidia-
ries. Using a sensitivity analysis and according to the inter-
national literature, the analysis was also performed using 
consolidated financial statements. For example, some pa-
rent companies act as holding companies, with a significant 
part of earnings and assets only represented in the conso-
lidated form.
The information was primarily collected throu-
gh the Economática database, with the main filter set 
as non-financial companies listed on BM&FBovespa 
that had a balance of deferred assets on 31/12/2007. 
After identifying these companies, their accounting 
statements were obtained through the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s website (Standard Financial 
Statements/Demonstrações Financeiras Padronizadas 
- DFP). Some companies, such as Magnetisa, Datasul, 
and Eleva, were excluded because they had cancelled 
their registration during 2008 and thus did not submit 
financial statements during the period in which the 
choice was made.
The explanatory notes of each company were analy-
sed to identify the choice of whether to maintain or de-
recognise the balance of deferred assets. Analysing the 
notes is justified because if a company had a “zero” ba-
lance at the end of 2008, its choice to have a low balance 
of deferred assets or simply a reduction would be ex-
plained by a transfer to other groups, such as intangible 
assets, according to CPC 13. The companies that simply 
transferred the balance were excluded from the analysis 
because they did not make a decision; instead, they were 
constrained by another accounting decree. 
The explanatory notes of 151 companies (189 con-
solidated) that had balances in deferred assets for the 
year 2007 were analysed. Only 55 of these companies 
(45 consolidated) reclassified their balances to other 
groups. After this exclusion, the final sample consisted 
of 96 companies (144 consolidated) with a balance of 
deferred assets subject to choice, as shown in Table 1 
below.
The companies were divided in two groups:
- Group 1: 54 companies (91 consolidated) that op-
ted to maintain the balances in December 2008 after 
the reclassifications were made mandatory and
- Group 2: 42 companies (53 consolidated) that op-
ted to derecognise the balance of deferred assets in De-
cember 2008.
The amount of the deferred asset balance subject to 
choice was determined by reading financial statements 
published on 31/12/2008. For the companies that chose 
to keep the balance, the amount shown on 31/12/2008 
was used. For those that opted to derecognise the ba-
lance, the figure reported in the quarterly report for 
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 Table 2  Variables
Variable Name Construct Expected Sign Proxy
AC Accounting Choice Companies that derecognised the balance 
or maintained the balance of the deferred 
assets
Dummy variable:                          
D = 0 – derecognise                                
D = 1 – maintain
CG Level of corporate governance Companies that have different levels of CG Derecognise (-) Dummy variable:                    
D = 0 – does not have                                  
D = 1 – has




Derecognise (-) Dummy variable:                    
D = 0 – does not compensate          
D = 1 – compensates
ADR American Depositary Receipt Paper issued and negotiated in the New 
York Stock Exchange
Derecognise (-) Dummy variable:                    
D = 0 – does not issue ADRs                  
D = 1 – issues ADRs
BIGFOUR Auditing firm Companies audited by the Big Four Derecognise (-) Dummy variable:                    
D = 0 – not audited by Big Four      
D = 1 – audited by Big Four
SD Size of deferred assets Maintain (+) Natural logarithm of the De-
ferred Asset Balance subject to 
choice. Alternately, the balance 
of deferred assets/assets subject 
to choice (the values were divi-
ded by 100 million).
REV Revaluation Reserve Whether the company had a balance in 
revaluation reserves on 31/12/2007
Maintain (+) Dummy variable:                    
D = 0 – No balance                   
D = 1 – Balance greater than 
zero
DEBT Debt Indebtedness measured by: (debt/total 
assets)
Maintain (+) Result of the ratio between total 
debt and total assets4
SIZE Size of the company Derecognise (-) Natural logarithm of total 
assets (equity or total revenue). 
Alternately, we used the balance 
of total assets, equity, and 
total revenue (the values were 
divided by 100 million. The 
database for these values refers 
to 31/12/20075.
4 The use of total assets instead of equity is justified by the reduced number of observations because some companies have negative equity. The results were also calculated with this specification, and the conclusions 
were similar in terms of statistical significance and coefficient signs.
5 Selecting the 2007 database is justified to avoid endogeneity problems, given that the 2008 values were already impacted by the accounting choice made regarding deferred assets.
the third quarter of 2008 was used as a proxy becau-
se the amount does not appear on the 2008 financial 
statements (“zero” balance). Note that some companies 
continued to recognise pre-operating expenses and res-
tructuring during 2008 because Provisional Measure 
449/2008 was only published in December 2008.
Information on companies that issued ADRs were 
collected through the New York Stock Exchange’s web-
site. This procedure was adopted in case there were no 
companies that emitted an ADR after the 2008 balance, 
as such a situation would skew the analysis. 
The variables related to the type of auditing com-
pany (Big Four or not), different levels of corporate 
governance, and compensation of administrators based 
on profits were obtained through the Annual Informa-
tion (Informações Anuais - IAN) available on the Secu-
rities Commission’s website.
 3.2  model
In this study, the dependent variable is the binary variable 
capturing the choice between two valid accounting choices. 
The dummy variable for Accounting Choice (AC) was 
defined as 0 if the AC was to derecognise the balance of 
the deferred assets and 1 if the AC was to maintain the 
deferred balance until the end of its amortisation period. 
Note that the variable AC was calculated for both indivi-
dual and consolidated financial statements because some 
parent companies do not have balances, unlike their sub-
sidiaries. The results will be presented for the parent com-
pany, and later, data based on consolidated statements 
will be shown to determine the sensitivity of the results 
and enable comparisons.
Based on the potential relationships between constructs 
and the accounting choices discussed in the theoretical 
framework, the metrics used in this study are presented in 
Table 2.
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 Table 3  Descriptive Statistics 
Type of Demonstration Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Parent company
SD (deferred assets) 95 24262,83 91187,9 1 839257
SD ln(deferred assests) 96 7,98 2,39 0 13,64
SIZE (total assets) 95 5587388 19200000 12470 158000000
SIZE ln(total assets) 95 13,92 1,72 9,43 19,17
SIZE (equity) 83 473876,9 5432024 10192 31700000
SIZE ln(equity) 83 13,57 1,64 9,23 18,57
SIZE (earnings) 73 473876,9 1089212 341 7865776
SIZE ln(earnings) 73 11,52 2,08 5,83 16,91
SIZE (revenue) 82 2024192 3598753 82 21800000
SIZE ln(revenue) 82 12,93 2,5 4,41 18,66
DEBT 95 0,61 0,6 0,01 3,74
Consolidated
SD (deferred assets) 144 59191,19 293921,2 1 3469846
SD ln(deferred assets) 144 8,78 2,41 0 15,06
SIZE (total assets) 142 6783771 22400000 12492 231000000
SIZE ln(total assets) 142 14,29 1,73 7,43 19,26
SIZE (equity) 130 2770269 7427155 3880 57000000
SIZE ln(equity) 130 13,57 1,65 6,14 18,55
SIZE (earnings) 109 460568,3 1027954 405 8473604
SIZE ln(earnings) 109 11,37 2,21 3,64 16,88
SIZE (revenue) 139 3177119 5314405 352 30600000
SIZE ln(revenue) 139 13,57 2,19 5,52 18,95
DEBT 142 0,65 0,44 0,09 3,38
SD = size of deferred assets; SD (deferred assets) = balance of deferred assets subject to choice; SD ln(deferred assets) = natural logarithm of the balance of 
deferred assets subject to choice; SIZEi = size of the company; SIZEi (total assets) = balance of total assets; SIZEi ln(total assets) = natural logarithm of total 
assets; SIZEi (equity) = balance of equity; SIZEi ln(equity) = natural logarithm of equity; SIZEi (earnings) = balance of earnings; SIZEi ln(earnings) = natural lo-
garithm of earnings; SIZEi (revenue) = amount of total revenue; SIZEi ln(revenue) = natural logarithm of revenue; and ENDIV = value of indebtedness (debt/
total assets).
6 The results were also calculated without a control for outliers, and the results are qualitatively similar, with the same statistical significance and coefficient signs.
 Table 4  Matrix of Correlations





ADR 0,21 0,06 1,00
BIGFOUR 0,28 0,07 0,12 1,00
REV -0,10 0,06 0,01 -0,23 1,00
DEBT -0,18 -0,05 -0,05 0,06 0,01 1,00
SD (deferred assets) -0,09 0,11 0,33 0,15 0,06 0,06 1,00
SD ln(deferred assets) 0,06 0,14 0,44 0,07 -0,08 0,06 0,50 1,00
continues
 4  dAtA AnAlysIs
 4.1  descriptive statistics and frequency analysis
To reduce the effect of outliers, the Windsor technique 
was applied to the following variables: size of deferred as-
sets (SD), size of the company (SIZE), and debt (DEBT). 
Thus, 2% of the total sample was treated (1% from each tail 
of the distribution)6. Alternately, the natural logarithm was 
used for the SD and SIZE variables. The descriptive statis-
tics are shown in Table 3 below.
The test group consisted of 96 companies (144 con-
solidated) that had a balance of deferred assets subject to 
choice according to the provisions of Law 11.941/2009. Of 
these companies, 54 (91 consolidated) opted to maintain 
their balances and 42 (53 consolidated) wrote off the ac-
count against equity. Table 4 shows the correlation matrix 
between the variables used in this study and those based 
on the parent company’s financial statements. Because the 
independent variable is dichotomous, it is important to test 
whether they are highly correlated.
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GC PE ADR BIGFOUR REV DEBT SD (defer-red assets)
SD ln(deferred 
assets)
SIZE (total assets) -0,02 0,05 0,54 0,01 0,20 -0,13 0,79 0,38
SIZE ln(total assets) 0,10 -0,09 0,73 0,23 0,02 0,02 0,47 0,52
SIZE (equity) 0,05 0,04 0,67 0,00 0,18 -0,20 0,61 0,39
SIZE ln(equity) 0,14 -0,07 0,72 0,20 0,02 -0,27 0,42 0,48
SIZE (earnings) -012 0,09 0,55 0,14 0,15 -0,05 0,82 0,41
SIZE ln(earnings) 0,02 0,02 0,58 0,20 -0,11 -0,02 0,40 0,35
SIZE (total revenue) -0,02 0,15 0,75 0,19 -0,01 0,06 0,69 0,53
SIZE ln(total revenue) -0,01 0,10 0,56 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,43 0,55
Table 4 continued
 Table 5  Estimation of logit model for the parent company (equation 1)
ACi = β0 + β1CGi+ β2PEi + β3ADRi+ β4BIGFOURi+ β5SDi + β6REVi+ β7DEBTi + β8SIZEi+ ε
AC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CG -1,23** -1,47** -0,99* -1,22** -1,63*** -1,70*** -1,27** -1,50**
BIGFOUR 1,79*** 1,43** 1,67*** 1,59** 1,81** 1,47** 1,15* 1,18*
SD
SD ln(deferred assets) 0,27** 0,22* 0,30** 0,24*
SD (deferred assets) 3,28** 2,82* 2,58* 4,22**
SIZE
SIZE ln(total assets) -0,46**





SIZE ln(total revenue) -0,41**
SIZE (total revenue) -0,04**
Number of observations 92 92 81 81 79 71 71 79
Prob>Chi2 0,001 0,001 0,007 0,001 0,001 0,004 0,017 0,005
Pseudo R2 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,16 0,18 0,15 0,11 0,14
Table 4 indicates that the correlations are typically 
smaller than 0.20, with two exceptions. The companies that 
issue ADRs are typically large, and thus, the correlations 
between this variable and the proxies for size are larger 
(0.54 to 0.78). The size of deferred assets and the size of the 
company are also correlated (0.35 to 0.82), as larger compa-
nies generally have higher balances of pre-operating costs 
and restructuring expenses. It is expected that controlling 
for size (SIZE) in the regressions will allow for the incre-
mental contribution of the variables size (SD) and ADR to 
be evaluated. 
 4.2  results of the logit regression
Equation 1 presents the (stepwise) logistic regression 
model (stepwise) used in this study with the variables des-
cribed in Table 2.
Equation (1) – Model
ACi = β0 + β1CGi+ β2PEi + β3ADRi+ β4BIGFOURi+ β5SDi  
                  + β6REVi+ β7DEBTi + β8SIZEi+ ε 1
Note that eight specifications were used because of the 
different measures of the size of the deferred asset balance 
(SD) and the company (SIZE). Each specification uses one 
form of measurement for deferred assets (natural logari-
thm of the deferred asset balance or the balance of deferred 
assets divided by 100 million) and the size of the company 
(natural logarithm or the balance of total assets, equity, ear-
nings, or total revenue divided by 100 million. 
Different measures of size (SIZE) are used to determi-
ne whether the results are consistent and identify different 
incentives related to the choice of whether to maintain the 
balance. The results for the parent company are shown in 
Table 5.
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ACi = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i opts to maintain the balance of deferred assets and 0 if it opts to derecognise the balance; 
CGi = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i participates in different levels of corporate governance of BM&FBovespa and 0 when it does 
not participate; ADRi = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i has a program for ADRs and 0 when it does not; PEi = dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firm i has a program for administrative participation in earnings and 0 when it does not; BIGFOURi = dummy variable equal to 
1 when firm i is audited by a Big Four firm and 0 if not; SDi = size of deferred assets for firm i; SD ln(deferred assets)i = natural logarithm of the 
balance of the deferred assets of firm i; SD (deferred assets) i = balance of the deferred assets of firm i divided by 100 million; REVi = dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 when firm i had a balance in the 2007 revaluation reserve account; DEBTi = value of indebtedness (debt/equity) for firm 
i; SIZEi =size of company i; SIZEi ln(total assets) = natural logarithm of the total assets of company i; SIZEi (total assets) = balance of the total assets 
of firm i divided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(equity) = natural logarithm of the equity of company i; SIZEi (equity) = balance of the equity of firm i 
divided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(earnings) = natural logarithm of the earnings of company i; SIZEi (earnings) = balance of the earnings of firm i di-
vided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(revenue) = natural logarithm of the earnings of company i; SIZEi (revenue) = balance of the revenue of firm i divided 
by 100 million.
 *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
7 According to IAS 16 – Property, Plant and Equipment and IAS 38 – Intangible Assets.
8 The auditing companies are from different sectors and there is not more than one Big Four firm with more than two clients in each sector. The auditing firms and the respective sectors (number of clients) are (a) KPMG – 
Energy (5), Food and drinks (4), Textiles (3), Steel (2), and Vehicles (2); (b) PriceWaterhouseCoopers – Chemicals (3); (c) Deloitte – Pulp and Paper (3), Trade (2); and Ernst & Young – Transportation (2).
As shown in Table 5, the variables CG, BigFour, SD, 
and SIZE have statistically significant impacts on the ac-
counting choice depending on the specification of the 
model. Some variables are only significant at 10%, but 
it is important to note that there were fewer than 100 
observations. 
As expected, companies with officially recognised le-
vels of corporate governance opted to derecognise the 
balance of deferred assets. One possible explanation 
for this finding is that the desire to voluntarily signal 
a strong corporate governance structure may be linked 
to an attempt to approach the international accounting 
model7. These results fit with those of other studies that 
show a difference in the behaviour of managers and their 
accounting choices when companies intend to signal 
“good” governance practices (Ramos & Martinez, 2006; 
Lopes & Walker, 2012).
The size of the deferred asset balance (SD) was also 
related to the decision to maintain the balance. When 
controlling for the size of the company (SIZE), a larger 
balance size corresponded with a greater probability 
that the company chose to maintain that balance. This 
fact confirms the expectation that the managers evalu-
ated the impact of the ownership structure and/or the 
earnings of the company, supporting the evaluation of 
this trade-off presented by Cormier, Demaria, Lapoin-
te-Antunes, and Teller (2009). 
The ADR variable did not have a significant impact 
in the sample studied here. Thus, there is no eviden-
ce that the behaviours of the companies in this sample 
group were influenced by their dual listing. It is not pos-
sible to say that the choice results from an attempt to 
make the Brazilian accounting model similar to the U.S. 
model (US-GAAPs). Note that the lack of statistical sig-
nificance in the ADR results could be because only 15 
firms in the sample issued ADRs, as shown in Table 4 
(23 consolidated). 
Administrative participation in earnings did not 
have a significant impact on the accounting choice, in-
dicating that the managers may not consider the amor-
tisation expense to be significant. Another explanation 
for this result is that the choice to maintain or derecog-
nise the deferred asset balance may not impact stock 
prices, which would fit with the conclusion of Rezende 
(2005) that deferred assets are not relevant for the Bra-
zilian market. 
The REV variable also did not have a statistically signifi-
cant impact. Thus, it was not possible to determine conclu-
sively whether a balance in the revaluation reserve influen-
ced the decision to maintain or derecognise the balance of 
deferred assets. The evidence may show that incentives to 
maintain the revaluation balance, such as covenants, can 
be different from incentives to maintain or derecognise the 
deferred assets. 
The behaviour of companies audited by the Big Four 
firms was expected to be different from that of com-
panies audited by other firms. However, as shown in 
Table 1, the expectation was that firms audited by a Big 
Four firm would decide to derecognise the balance be-
cause of their attempt to approximate the international 
model. 
The obtained association between Big Four auditing 
firms and maintaining the balance was not expected ba-
sed on the literature review. The coefficient should be in-
terpreted with caution because the Big Four variable can 
indirectly capture other firm characteristics (Lawrence et 
al., 2011). Because the total sample size was 96 observa-
tions (144 consolidated), it was not possible to control for 
factors such as economic sector8. 
Thus, to more thoroughly evaluate whether the re-
sults reflect the influence of the size of the auditing 
firm on accounting choices, the eight original specifi-
cations were changed to exclude the variable Big Four 
and include dummy variables for each of the Big Four 
firms (instead of a single variable representing all four 
companies). 
The results shown in Table 6 are similar in almost all 
specifications in terms of both coefficient signs and statis-
tical significance. Note that the level of corporate gover-
nance does not exhibit a statistically significant effect in 
specification 3 and shows a smaller statistical significance 
in some specifications (1, 4, 5, and 6).
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 Table 6   Estimation of the model for parent companies (Equation 1 with dummies for each Big Four firm)
ACi = β0 + β1CGi+ β2PEi + β3ADRi+       βnBIGFOURi+ β5SDi + β6REVi+ β7DEBTi + β8SIZEi+ ε
AC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
CG -0,88* -1,27** - -0,98* -1,26** -1,18** -0,85** -1,32**
BIGFOUR
KPMG 1,80*** 1,76** 1,69*** 1,69*** 1,74** 1,22** 1,12*
PWC 1,66** 1,69** 1,68** 1,34* 1,68**
SD
SD ln(deferred assets) 0,34** 0,29** 0,36** 0,24*
SD(deferred assets) 4,31** 3,79** 2,67* 4,76**
SIZE
SIZE ln(total assets) -0,41**





SIZE ln(total revenue) -0,25**
SIZE (total revenue) -0,04**
Number of observations 92 92 81 81 71 71 79 79
Prob>Chi2 0,001 0,000 0,003 0,001 0,002 0,006 0,044 0,003









REVi = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i has a balance in the 2007 revaluation reserve account; DEBTi = value of indebtedness (debt/equity) of 
firm i; SIZEi = size of company i; SIZEi ln(total assets) = natural logarithm of the total assets of company i; SIZEi (total assets) = balance of the total assets of 
firm i divided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(equity) = natural logarithm of the equity of company i; SIZEi (equity) = balance of the equity of firm i divided by 100 
million; SIZEi ln(earnings) = natural logarithm of the earnings of company i; SIZEi (earnings) = balance of the earnings of firm i divided by 100 million; SIZEi 





9 Only the results for the regressions that used the dummies for each Big Four firm are shown. The results with the BIGFOUR dummy are similar to those shown in Table 4 in terms of coefficient signs and statistical 
significance.
Two of the auditing firms are positively associated with 
companies that maintained the balance (KPMG and Pri-
cewaterhouseCoopers). No coefficient was statistically sig-
nificant for Deloitte, and Ernst & Young was only signifi-
cant for the eighth specification. Thus, the results can be 
interpreted based on Lawrence et al. (2011), who showed 
that differences in quality between companies based on 
whether they are audited by the Big Four firms can only re-
flect client characteristics; they cannot reflect the influence 
of the auditing company. 
Because the results are not consistent among each of 
the Big Four firms, it is not possible to say that the effect 
in Table 5 was caused by the size of the auditing firm. An 
alternative explanation for this result is the establishment 
of individual policies by each auditing firm or even the fact 
that different firms audit clients from different sectors. Fu-
ture studies on accounting choices should use other control 
variables, such as sector, to segregate the firm characteris-
tics from the auditor. 
 4.3  sensitivity analysis
To evaluate whether the characteristics that guided the 
parent companies’ choices are similar for the entire econo-
mic group, logistic regression was used for the consolida-
ted financial statements using the BIGFOUR9 variable and 
dummies for each Big Four firm: KPMG, PWC, Deloitte, 
and Ernst & Young.
The results shown in Table 7 indicate that when con-
trolling for the size of the firm, higher amounts of deferred 
assets (SD) correspond to a higher probability that the firm 
maintains the balance. As for the different levels of corpo-
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 Table 7   – Estimation of the model for consolidated statements (equação 1 whit dummies for each Big Four firm)
ACi = β0 + β1CGi+ β2PEi + β3ADRi+       βnBIGFOURi+ β5SDi + β6REVi+ β7DEBTi + β8SIZEi+ ε
AC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant - - - - - 1,10*** - -
GC -1,42*** -1,62*** -1,34*** -1,53*** -1,40*** -1,40*** -1,52*** -1,54***
BIGFOUR
KPMG 1,63*** 2,08*** 1,57*** 2,03*** 1,06* 1,32** 1,82*** 2,23***
PWC 2,05*** 2,36*** 2,16*** 2,38*** 1,98** 2,30***
Deloitte -1,49** -1,28*
Ernst & Young 1,16* 1,37* 1,22*
SD
SD ln(deferred assets) 0,34*** 0,42*** 0,46*** 0,37***
SD(deferred assets) 2,6** 2,52*** 2,1** 2,78**
SIZE
SIZE ln(total assets) -0,36**





SIZE ln(total revenue) -0,37***
SIZE (total revenue) -0,02**
Number of observations 134 134 124 124 104 104 131 131
Prob>Chi2 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000







otherwise; Ernst & Young = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i is audited by Ernst & Young and 0 otherwise; SDi = size of the deferred assets 
of firm i; SD ln(deferred assets) i = natural logarithm of the balance of the deferred assets of firm i; SD (deferred assets) i = balance of the deferred assets of 
firm i divided by 100 million; REVi = dummy variable that is equal to 1 when firm i had a balance in its 2007 revaluation reserve account; DEBTi = value 
of indebtedness (debt/equity) for firm i; SIZEi = size of company i; SIZEi ln(total assets) = natural logarithm of the total assets of company i; SIZEi (total assets) 
= balance of the total assets of firm i divided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(equity) = natural logarithm of the equity of company i; SIZEi (equity) = balance of the 
equity of firm i divided by 100 million; SIZEi ln(earnings) = natural logarithm of the earnings of company i; SIZEi (earnings) = balance of the earnings of firm 






rate governance according to BM&FBOVESPA (CG), the 
relationship was reversed. It is not possible to claim that 
auditing performed by a Big Four firm implies the choice 
to maintain the deferred asset balance. The coefficients are 
positive and significant for KPMG and PWC (except for 
specifications 5 and 6). For Ernst & Young, the coefficients 
are positive and significant at the 10% level only for three 
specifications (2, 4, and 8). For Deloitte, the coefficients are 
only statistically significant for two specifications (5 and 6), 
but they are negative, unlike the others. 
The sensitivity analysis indicates that the same cha-
racteristics explain the decision to maintain or dere-
cognise the balance of deferred assets for the parent 
company and for the economic group as a whole. These 
results can contribute to future research on intragroup 
accounting choices. 
 5  conclusIon
Laws 11.638/2007 and 11.941/2009 introduced sig-
nificant changes to accounting standards in Brazil. The 
implementation of these laws enabled this study of the 
firm characteristics that are related to accounting choi-
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references
ces made regarding deferred assets. 
This analysis identified 96 companies (144 consoli-
dated) that could opt to maintain or lower the balances 
of their deferred assets. The analysis identified three 
variables that were related to the decision of how to 
treat this balance: the levels of corporate governance 
according to BM&FBovespa, audit performance by Big 
Four firms, and the size of the deferred assets, con-
trolling for the size of the company. These results have 
implications for regulators and companies. 
The results regarding governance indicate that 
companies that seek to attract investors through the 
BM&FBOVESPA system are more likely to implement 
international accounting policies. This fact, combined 
with the non-significant result for the ADR variable, 
may imply that companies that had exposure to diffe-
rent accounting models before the convergence in Bra-
zil prefer an accelerated reduction of these differences. 
The variable indicating whether a company is audi-
ted by a Big Four firm raises new questions regarding 
why the clients of large auditing firms behave differen-
tly than those who are audited by smaller firms. The 
results show that the variable indicating the size of the 
auditor can be an indirect proxy for sets of firm charac-
teristics, making it difficult to interpret these results. 
This issue presents an opportunity for future research 
because it is related to accounting choices, which is a 
theme that has received little attention in Brazil and 
is increasingly discussed in the literature (Lawrence et 
al., 2011).
The size of deferred assets can influence a company’s 
choice as to whether the balance should be maintained. 
This behaviour is consistently supported after controlling 
for company size (SIZE) using different measurements. 
This fact highlights that the size of the balance can be 
fundamental in directing choices (Cormier et al., 2009). 
These results suggest that a similar study should be per-
formed on accounting choices made for the adoption of 
International Accounting Standards in Brazil. 
In conclusion, this study identified certain company 
characteristics that are relevant for accounting choices, 
thus contributing to the literature on the manner in 
which economic incentives impact the creation of in-
formation in the Brazilian market. 
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